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ABSTRACT

Friederich Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty provides us with a theory of freedom, one
that seeks to minimize coercion in the name of progress. The concept of progress is the
grounding for Hayek’s entire theory. It ultimately provides the value of both liberty and those
things which derive their value by preserving, promoting, and constituting liberty, such as rights
and laws more generally. The problem is that progress is an ill-defined concept because Hayek’s
descriptions of it are so vague that it cannot provide any satisfying explanation of why progress
itself is desirable and, consequently, why we should promote liberty and rights. My solution to
this problem is to present John Finnis’s theory of natural law (as given in Natural Law and
Natural Rights) in order to provide explicit content to the idea of progress. Using natural law’s
emphasis of basic goods such as life, knowledge, and sociability, I show why progress and its
derivatives are, in fact, desirable. In particular, I focus on the problems this lack of grounding
presents for rights and how natural law’s focus on practical reason can provide moral principles
by which we can distinguish good rights from bad ones.
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INTRODUCTION

The problem before us is one of value. The primary political concepts which we shall discuss—
rights, liberty, and progress—are all connected to each other through a chain of value. Rights are
only good insofar as they protect liberty, which is only good insofar as it promotes progress. We
owe this chain to Friedrich Hayek. For it is in The Constitution of Liberty (hereafter CL) that this
chain is described, though not explicitly.1 By and by, we wish to know what progress is and why
it is desirable. If we can know the value of progress, we can know the value of liberty and,
hence, answer important questions about rights. As often happens, this topic seems rather
abstract at first, but the implications for our lives are immense.
The question of rights is the one with the most consequential bearing on our everyday
lives and is our chief motivation in solving this problem. It seems that each day brings a new
debate about what we do and do not have a right to do. Do white supremacists have a right to
march on college campuses? Do women have a right to seek an abortion? Do the faithful have a
right to gather during a pandemic? What answering these questions requires is a limiting
principle for rights, meaning a principle which tells us why we should have some rights rather
than others. Making sense of what a limiting principle is and how it functions in this case
requires a robust theory of rights. Fortunately, our task is not to develop such a theory; we need
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We should not be surprised that Hayek never placed rights, liberty, and progress in explicit conjunction. If he had,
he would likely have noticed the problem which this paper addresses.
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only describe one which already exists. Classical liberalism (not to be confused with the modern
sense of the word ‘liberal,’ meaning a person of the political left) is just such a theory, and its
greatest champion in the 20th century, Hayek, will be our guide.2
According to classical liberals, rights are a kind of social institution. That is, they are
generally agreed upon behaviors in certain contexts. We will flesh out this idea much more in
Section I, but we should immediately flag that a rights-as-social-institutions approach allows for
a great deal of variety and granularity. We can have rights that are of different kinds, that have
different functions, that are or are not codified, etc. We should always avoid narrow
understandings of social institutions that reduce all of them to mere social norms. Which side of
the sidewalk to walk on (a social norm) is one kind of social institution, but so is marriage and
promise-keeping and many of the other more complex and more important forms of group
behavior in which we participate.3 Rights are social institutions that are not only deeply
ingrained in societies but also complex, requiring careful analysis to discover what is and is not
contained within the institution.4
Hayek is a wonderful expositor of this view, but his account is incomplete. Like all
classical liberals, Hayek views rights as social institutions and an important part of liberty. His
view can be roughly summarized by stating that the most important institutions become what we
call rights. Unlike others, though, Hayek avoids relying on morality as a grounding for liberty
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I will use the terms ‘classical liberalism,’ ‘liberalism,’ and the related forms of these words interchangeably.
This does not mean that mere social norms are not institutions. It does, however, mean that the difference between
mere social norms and rights is large, just as the difference between a garden and the agricultural system is so great
that it makes more sense to think of then in very different ways, even if the same basic thing—planting seeds and
harvesting them—is at play.
4
We should also caution against conceiving of social institutions as mere agreement. Though institutions may
rightly be conceived as party constituted by psychological phenomena such as expectations, they are certainly not
solely within the mind.
3
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and thus for rights as well. He does not claim that liberty is a moral good; he claims that liberty
is good because it promotes progress. Unfortunately, just what progress is and why it is valuable
is something very much unclear. This lack of grounding leaves us unmoored when it comes to
analysis and defense. As we will see, it becomes incredibly difficult to figure out how to reject
intuitively bad social institutions without a grounding, which means that we lack justification
(i.e., a limiting principle) for why some rights should stay rather than others.
We can only address these issues if we tackle two prior but related topics: human action
and morality. Due to the ambiguity of ‘progress,’ Hayek’s approach ultimately fails to give us
sufficient explanation of why liberty is valuable. Call this ‘the motivation problem.’ Liberty’s tobe-pursued quality only comes if we first outline some normative principles of human action that
tell us what progress is and why liberty is important for us. Because liberty itself is insufficiently
motivated, we cannot answer pressing questions about rights. What rights are is an easy topic for
us: they are social institutions. What rights we should and should not have is something we do
not know, and we cannot answer this question by appeal to an unmotivated concept of liberty.5 A
normative question requires a normative answer, which means that we need a moral basis upon
which to separate good rights from bad ones. Call this ‘the moral problem.’6
My contention is that a natural law theory, which seeks to establish basic values that all
humans pursue and derive morality from them, is uniquely suited to solve these problems. John

5

A related question is “What rights do we in fact have?” Though this question is difficult, it does have an answer for
the classical liberal. We have a right to f insofar as there exists a sufficiently important social institution of which
f-ing is either a part or the entirety of the institution. Fleshing out such a statement would be fascinating but is only
tangential to our concerns and is thus well beyond the scope of this paper.
6
Distinguishing these issues by the terms ‘motivation’ and ‘moral’ is merely an attempt to provide a somewhat
explanatory name to each. We need not accept this nomenclature, nor should we forget that the essential problems as
to how rights relate to liberty and how liberty relates to progress are both grounding problems.
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Finnis’ Natural Law and Natural Rights will be our source here. Natural law theory as presented
by Finnis is amenable to classical liberalism, but it is not a replacement. Not all aspects of
natural law, nor indeed all natural law theorists, are friendly to liberalism. We must keep it ever
before us that our goal is not to show that Hayek was or should have been a natural law theorist.
We instead aspire to show that Hayek’s theory is 1) incomplete and, therefore, vulnerable and 2)
amenable to a natural law solution.
We shall proceed as follows. In Section I, we will define liberty and argue that its value is
derived from progress. We will then demonstrate that progress is so ambiguous that we cannot
make sense of the value of liberty. In Section II, we will define rights and show that the
grounding problems for liberty also affect rights, preventing us from sorting the good social
institutions from the bad. In Section III, we will offer natural law as a solution to both of these
problems.

4

I. LIBERTY, PROGRESS, AND THE MOTIVATION PROBLEM
Though the impetus for our project is first and foremost to help us decide among rights,
we must first discuss liberty. The main reason for this is that, until we understand the problems
attendant to liberty and progress, we have an “easy” answer to the problems of rights. If we wish
to know which rights we should and should not have, we can simply say that we want those that
help promote liberty. We are attempting to head off this response at the pass by showing that we
do not know why liberty is something we should promote. More specifically, we do not know
why liberty as Hayek presents it is valuable.
Section I.I: What is Liberty?
Liberty is a minimum of coercion, that is, “[t]he state in which man is not subject to the
arbitrary will of another or others” (pg. 58).7, 8 You have liberty insofar as others do not have the
power to impose their will upon you arbitrarily, to manipulate the circumstances so that the least
disagreeable option available to you is the one orchestrated to comply with their desires rather
than your own. Such manipulation of circumstances can include everything from government
intervention to a highwayman demanding money at gunpoint.
Liberty, then, is a characteristic of social and political arrangements measured by how
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This as similar to Isaiah Berlin’s comments: “It is only because I believe that my inability to get a given thing is
due to the fact that other human beings have made arrangements whereby I am, whereas others are not, prevented
from [some action] that I think myself a victim of coercion or slavery” (emphasis mine, 1969, pg. 3).
8
Though liberty increases as coercion decreases, maximizing liberty is not logically equivalent to minimizing
coercion since liberty requires other things, namely robust social institutions, to exist. However, it seems safe to
follow Hayek and use the phrases as if they are equivalent so long as we remember this caveat. In any case, Hayek
seems to have preferred to couch liberty in terms of minimizing coercion: "I know of no way of preventing coercion
altogether and…all we can hope to achieve is to minimize it or rather its harmful effects” (1981).
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well we can plan our lives against a backdrop of possibilities for action. “The law tells him what
facts he may count on and thereby extends the range within which he can predict the
consequences of his actions…This means that what he is allowed or required to do must depend
only on circumstances he can be presumed to know or be able to ascertain” (pg. 225). We have
more liberty when we are free to plan our lives in the absence of coercion. This planning
component is what makes law and social institutions constitutive of liberty. Part of what it means
to be free in this sense is to rely on broad agreement of what actions are and are not permitted,
thereby making coercion unnecessary. What laws and social institutions do is give us
frameworks that create stability so that we can better plan.9
To plan is to use our knowledge effectively. “The rationale of securing to each individual
a known range within which he can decide on his actions is to enable him to make the fullest use
of his knowledge, especially of his concrete and often unique knowledge of the particular
circumstances of time and place” (pg. 224). Hayek’s point is that the knowledge that we have of
our lives is unique and something that only we possess and, as such, something which only we
are in a position to use best. However, the effective use of our particular knowledge rests on
other people doing the same, which creates a network of knowledge no one can fully understand.
As a result, most of what we do in our daily lives relies on events of which we know nothing. “It
might be said that civilization begins when the individual in the pursuit of his ends can make use
of more knowledge than he has himself acquired and when he can transcend the boundaries of
his ignorance by profiting from knowledge he does not himself possess” (Hayek pg. 73). We

9

See Feser (2003) for an in-depth discussion of Hayek’s views on the role law and tradition play in creating
stability. See also Budolfson (2018) and Ostrom (1990, 1998, 1999, 2010, 2007) for how social arrangements can
produce stability absent formal systems of authority such as law.
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should always remember that ‘knowledge’ is an exceptionally broad term for Hayek; it means
not only explicit propositional knowledge but also know-how and the past experience of
centuries and millennia passed down through traditions.
Liberty, then, is the state at which broad agreement in the form of social institutions
allows us to outsource an enormous amount of work. “The manner in which we have learned to
order our day, to dress, to eat, to arrange our houses, to speak and write, and to use the countless
other tools and implements of civilization, no less than the “know-how” of production and trade,
furnishes us constantly with the foundations on which our own contributions to the process of
civilization must be based” (pg. 86). We build on what has come before, and this is why social
institutions are so important. They allow the transmission of knowledge from one generation to
another, which means that each generation does not have to learn anew what its predecessors
already discovered. Put another way, liberty allows people to make the best use of their
knowledge.
Section I.II: Progress and the Motivation Problem
We now must ask what it is that makes liberty valuable. Liberty is the state in which
coercion is minimized, which allows people to make the best use of their knowledge. It is hard to
overstate Hayek’s insistence on any one individual’s ignorance of the system of which she is a
part and the need to allow individuals to use their unique knowledge. “If there were omniscient
men, if we could know not only all that affects the attainment of our present wishes but also our
future wants and desires, there would be little case for liberty” (pg. 81). He then goes on to say
that “we want [liberty] because we have learned to expect from it the opportunity of realizing
many of our aims” (pg. 81). We should be clear that Hayek is not making a pragmatic (that is,
7

related to our interests) or subjectivist case for liberty here. He is not merely saying that liberty is
good because it gets us what we want. He thinks that liberty does gain its value from something
objective, namely, progress.
Liberty is not a good-in-itself; it is only progress that makes it worth preserving. The
complex system of knowledge use and transmission fostered by liberty allows us to move
forward in some way. Progress does not come in the form of any “striving by known means
toward a fixed aim” (pg. 94). Hayek, in fact, prefers the term ‘evolution’ because we do not
know at any point what comes next. Progress encompasses advances of all kinds. We progress
when we discover new material goods, new cultural treasures, new ways of doing something. It
was progress when the materials for the piano were invented, when the piano was assembled,
when music for it was written, and when an artist performed that music. ‘Progress’ clearly does
an enormous amount of work here. But, what is it?
The answer to this question is something at which Hayek only gestures. The clearest
definition is the following: “What matters is the successful striving for what at each moment
seems attainable. It is not the fruits of past success but the living in and for the future in which
human intelligence proves itself. Progress is movement for movement’s sake, for it is in the
process of learning, and in the effects of having learned something new, that man enjoys the gift
of his intelligence” (pg. 95). Even though this passage is beautiful, it is rather uninformative.
Hayek seems to be gesturing at some form of teleology, though that term may be controversial in
this context. There is just something about humans that makes progress worthwhile. We are
driven to “movement for movement’s sake” because we are hardwired in that way.
This answer is pointing in the right direction but is entirely insufficient. Unless we are
8

willing to regard the human tendency to progress as a brute fact, we cannot answer our questions
about the value of liberty. Saying that liberty is valuable because it tends to promote progress
only moves the question up a level; it does not answer it. Attempts to explain liberty as a value
lead us to highly subjectivist camps because we have to say that people merely prefer progress
rather than not. As we shall see, this problem not only affects liberty but also the means by which
we secure it.
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II. RIGHTS AND THE MORAL PROBLEM
We will now turn our attention to rights and the problems previously adumbrated. The
grounding problem of rights is most basically that we need a way to show why some rights are
good while others are bad. If rights are social institutions, we need a way to show why some
institutions should be allowed and others should not. In general terms, we might appeal to liberty
as a good, but we do not yet know what goodness liberty has to offer, what desirability makes it
preferable to the alternatives, at least in the abstract. As we discuss rights, we will bring to light
Hayek’s comments on morality and show how the lack grounding for liberty is also a problem
for rights.
Section II.I: What are Rights and What Do They Do?
For Hayek, and indeed all classical liberals, rights are individual rights. The individual,
on a liberal view, is a primarily social creature “whose whole nature and character is determined
by [her] existence in society” (Hayek 1957, pg. 6). It should be immediately stated that this
characterization is not meant imply any socialist, communist, or collectivist elements. In fact, it
is the erasure of the moral and political significance of the individual in favor of the collective
that liberals abhor. Rather, the social and empirical conception of an individual is contrasted with
the abstract, purely rational conception championed by philosophers such as T. H. Green and
Jean Paul Sartre. The former view means that the many ways people lead their lives will be in
large part based on traditions no one individual can establish or efface, and a great deal of
deference should be paid to those traditions. The latter view demands a rational demonstration of
10

the legitimacy of any societal element before it is accepted, and the rational faculty of the
individual rises paramount to all tradition. This disdain for what came before is that which turns
men into Burke’s “flies of a summer,” isolated from the knowledge and purpose that make
progress possible.
Rights are social institutions that assign to us a known sphere of influence. Most rights
are not, in fact, singular institutions. They are bundles of expectations and behaviors. Property
rights, for instance, are not as simple as “you own what you buy, create, and inherit.” There are a
large number of contingencies recognized in law and tradition that restrict that statement, such as
the doctrine of adverse possession. That being said, rights are so well established both in
common practice and in law that they allow us to predict how others will react to our actions.
This means that rights are not logical derivates of human nature or something “Godgiven.” They are evolved tools that we use to coexist and benefit from one another. When we
give the most fundamental social institutions (freedom of speech or of religion, say) the status of
rights, we prevent their erosion and thus go a long way toward securing liberty.
The exact nature of these institutions is difficult to formulate for many reasons. One
obstacle is that social institutions are malleable; they must adapt to changing circumstances or
fall out of use. Another problem is that social institutions are often not explicitly known or
considered by those who use them. This fact, of course, serves only to reinforce Hayek’s point
that we are ignorant of large parts of those things that make our lives possible
Despite these difficulties, Hayek does offer some helpful comments. As to what
determines the specific content of a right, Hayek says if “people are to make the best use of their
knowledge and capacities and foresight, it is desirable that they themselves have some voice in
11

the determination of what will be included in their personal protected sphere” (pg. 206) What
having a voice looks like is complicated and involves the interaction of several institutions. First,
a person can accept or deny a certain right and add a bit (albeit an infinitesimal bit) of
determination to an institution. Second, a person can actively stop the proliferation of an
institution to others, children and friends, say. Third, a person can use one institution (i.e., right)
to attack a another one, such as voting for or against an amendment to a constitution.
A final characteristic that we should mention is that rights are general. Free speech, for
example, is only useful or empowering as a right if it does not tell us which speech is allowed.
The sheer number of possibilities for speech makes it far easier to say what kinds of speech are
prohibited, e.g., defamation. Rights cover a range of possible cases and must remain general to
be useful.
Section II.II: Morality and the Grounding Problem
We are now at the main point of our argument and can summarize what has come before
as follows. Liberty, for all of its dignity, is not valuable in itself. As Hayek presents it, liberty is
the key to progress, which is the real benefit. Progress is “movement for movement’s sake” and
the process by which “man enjoys the gift of his intelligence.” Exactly what this means is
unclear, but it seems to assume some theory of human action, some explanation of motivation
and desire that makes progress worth pursuing, perhaps even on its own terms. Liberty, then, is
to be secured because we want progress. Rights are both causal of and constitutive of liberty.
They are social institutions which protect us by assigning to us certain spheres of influence so
that we can plan our actions and thus take advantage of and participate in progress. This requires
that we be free from the arbitrary coercion of our fellow men. Given all of that, the practical
12

question is what rights should we have to promote liberty?
And that question is where the problems truly begin. Saying rights should be only those
institutions that promote liberty and thus allow us to enjoy the gift of our intelligence is (pace
Hayek) useless. Just as justifying a public policy by simply appealing to the “greater good” is
unhelpful, so too does promoting movement for movement’s sake leave us with more questions
than answers. What we need is an understanding of progress that does not leave us unable to
distinguish between types of lives. Clearly, Hayek wishes to rule out certain types of living, e.g.,
the murderous highwayman, but he does not offer an idea of human flourishing or goodness to
achieve this goal. We only have ‘progress.’
It is here, at the level of rights, that we see this problem fully. David Sobel (2018) points
out that non-moralized conceptions of rights—that is, conceptions that do not take rights to have
a moral justification—create enormous problems. If we ask why we should not have a right to
murder, our initial response is that it is morally wrong. However, Hayek does not give us this
option. We cannot say that progress (and, therefore, rights) rules out murder because “movement
for movement’s sake” is too vacuous. We need to know which actions should be protected and
which prohibited. In other words, we are attempting to apply general normative principles of
human action to specific social institutions, which in the final tally is a moral task. 10
An example can help illustrate the nature of our project. In the Antebellum South, white
southerners had a right to own slaves. This right was well established within both society and the
legal system: the infamous Supreme Court case of Dred Scott vs. Sanford proves as much. How
are we to condemn slavery given what has come so far? We might say that this right should be

10

In fact, Steiner refers to rights as “normative allocations of liberty” (2018, pg. 77).
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prohibited because it conflicts with liberty, but the nature of Hayekian liberty is attuned to the
idea of progress. What prevents us from saying that intelligently crafted subjugation allows us to
progress more overall? Or why assume that all men should enjoy the gift of their intelligence,
especially if taking it some a few benefits the many? Without knowing more about progress, we
cannot appeal to liberty, and (from a theoretical standpoint) we cannot properly limit the kinds of
rights that are to be allowed.
So, what does Hayek say about morality? The short answer is that we inherit our morality,
which explains why it can change throughout history.11 We receive from birth instruction in what
we might call basic moral precepts that have a powerful sway over our minds and seem quite
“real,” more “real” than other social conventions. Remember, we are individuals “whose whole
nature and character is determined by [our] existence in society.” This feeling—the ‘emphatic
ought,’ as Philippa Foot (2011) calls it—is actually quite good because it deters us from upending
traditions, which make liberty possible. “It is indeed the truth, which all the great apostles of
freedom…have never tired of emphasizing, that freedom has never worked without deeply
ingrained moral beliefs and that coercion can be reduced to a minimum only where individuals can
be expected as a rule to conform voluntarily to certain principles” (pg. 123).
To be clear, Hayek is not a cultural relativist. He takes the preservation of some moral
beliefs over time as evidence of their independent value (Feser 2003). Furthermore, cultural groups
compete with each other for survival and flourishing. Over time, it stands to reason that the cultures
with the right beliefs will continue to thrive, while those who do not will die out. The idea seems
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This is clearly a gloss on a much more sophisticated take on the role of traditions. For a more in-depth look at the
role of rules of conduct, see Part I, Chapter 4, Section 6 of CL.
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to be that this evolution is some kind of discovery method for correct moral beliefs. Presumably,
that independent value which traditions have—evidenced by longevity—is also aimed at progress.
Traditions are good when they promote progress, just as liberty is good because it promotes
progress.
However, Hayek also repeatedly states that the moral beliefs that guide civilizations change
and that this change is part of progress. If social evolution once more produced the widespread
belief that slavery is good, what would make it bad? We just don’t know enough about progress
to be able to say. Furthermore, if values can change to seemingly any degree over the course of
time, why should liberty not be devalued as a matter of course? It seems that we are left with a
soured cultural relativism. After all, if our moral beliefs are only social institutions, why believe
that liberty and progress are not mere subjective preferences? Clearly, we have a grave problem.

15

III. THE NATURAL LAW SOLUTION
Section III.I: Human Action and Basic Goods
Natural law theories are often derided for their reliance on a naturalistic fallacy. The
accusation is that they attempt to draw conclusions about morality based on claims about human
nature. We should f because our (non-normative) natures are such that f-ing is good. This line of
reasoning is certainly fallacious because it derives an ‘ought’ from an ‘is,’ and it is important to
address this concern now. In Human Law and Human Justice, Julius Stone raises the issue this
way: “Have the natural lawyers shown that they can derive ethical norms from facts?” And John
Finnis’ answer is brisk: “They have not, nor do they need to, nor did the classical exponents of the
theory dream of attempting any such derivation” (pg. 33).12 Despite a worrisome trend that has
lasted until modern day,13 natural law theory in its classical form made no such commitments, and
we will happily stick to this form as exposited by Finnis.
The bedrock of natural law theory is the basic values.14 The list that Finnis provides is as
follows: Life, Knowledge, Play, Aesthetic Experience, Sociability, Practical Reasonableness,
Religion.15 We will discuss them in more detail in the coming paragraphs, but we should first
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All references to Finnis will be from Natural Law and Natural Rights.
Even scholars such as Feser (2014 and 2018) seem to fall into this trap.
14
Finnis takes great care to distinguish a basic value from an instrumental good, and his terminology reflects that
labor. For our purposes, I will use the terms ‘basic good’ and ‘basic value’ interchangeably.
15
This list is merely the one that Finnis gives, but other theorists have different lists, some with more goods, some
with less. However, our goal is show that classical liberalism is amenable to this kind of moral theory, not that
Finnis and his list of goods is, in fact, the correct one.
13
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describe their nature and the purpose they serve. What are we pursuing when we undertake a
project? We have basic inclinations that make us aware of certain goods upon which we base our
actions. When we identify a good, we can perceive its value upon reflection. This grasp of a basic
good’s value is underived. We cannot demonstrate it, but it is not in need of demonstration. It is
not an inference from any other fact or observation because it is self-evident.
We should stop here to address the concerns that often arise when self-evidence is
mentioned. To say that something is self-evident is not to say that it is something one knows from
birth. On the contrary, the basic good of knowledge, say, will only appear self-evidently valuable
to someone who has experienced the desire to know. There is the urge to know something because
it will serve some purpose, and then there is raw curiosity, the desire to discover the answer to
something merely to know it. This inclination is what points us in the direction of knowledge, but
it is not what gives knowledge value. The fact that our desire to know has psychological roots does
not denigrate knowledge’s value. We cannot call on other things to show the value of the basic
values because our evaluation of everything else is based on them.
The list from earlier serves as an explanation of human action. Finnis claims that “those
seven purposes are all of the basic purposes of human action” because they exhaust the reasonable
categories of motivation for a human being (pg. 92). It is important to note that we are now talking
only of value, which is not the same thing as talking about morality. That comes later. Right now,
all the basic goods provide is an understanding of the most basic kinds of human motivation toward
a reasonable goal. Recall that our critique of Hayekian liberty is that we do not know exactly why
it is valuable. We have an idea of something called ‘progress,’ but that term is so broad that our
explanation is rather quickly overwhelmed by vacuity. What natural law and the basic values
17

provide is a way to make sense of human action in explicit terms.
An exceptionally important point is that the values are all similarly basic. There is no
hierarchy that makes one more important than another because each is irreducible, valuable, and
incommensurable with the others. How, then, are we to make sense of the great variety of human
enterprises? Each value is general and can be participated in by an inexhaustible number of
activities. One never achieves Knowledge or Life or Play because it is not an endpoint; it is a value
in which we participate. Our projects and commitments are only a select few of the ways that these
goods can be instantiated in the world. What makes one choose one value over another in a given
circumstance is a matter of contingency, but that does not make it unreasonable. We all have
tendencies to commit more to some values than others, but these tendencies have nothing to do
with a greater value of the ones we choose. “[O]ne’s reasons for choosing the particular ranking
that one does choose are reasons that properly relate to one’s temperament, capacities, and
opportunities, not to differences of rank of intrinsic value between the basic values” (pg. 94).
If we interpret progress in light of this, we have a much clearer picture of why liberty
matters. We need freedom to try different things, make different commitments, concretize the
goods in unique ways because our motivations are geared toward the basic, underived, self-evident
goods. When our liberty is restricted too much, we lose our ability to participate in goods in ways
that we may find quite valuable and fulfilling. However, some restrictions of liberty only serve to
bring to light greater possibilities that we get from coexistence.16 What progress does, in Hayekian
terms, is give us the ability to build on the work that past generations have done and thus see more
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possibilities for concretization than we otherwise would have had.
Hayekian liberty highlights the need for natural social evolution, and natural law is
amenable to this point. Our participation in the values is particularly valuable to us because it is
we who participate in them. Part of the meaningful, authentic participation in the values requires
that they are not forced upon us. A lack of liberty in this area via coercion not only infringes the
bounds of practical reasonableness (as we will see in the next section) but also prevents us from
accessing the array of possibilities that allow us to choose the projects that best suit the things
outside of our control, such as temperament. This is a great boon for Hayek since such unchosen
aspects of our lives are incredibly important for his version of individualism. In other words, the
things in our lives which are out of our control will largely shape our commitments to the values,
and these social forces are key aspects of both progress and liberty.
Section III.II: Practically Reasonable Rights
Morality, as we traditionally conceive it, only now emerges for the natural law theorist.
Until now, the basic values have had no moral valence whatsoever. They are pre-moral
explanations for human action, goods that we pursue and that are no doubt valuable, but the
goodness they possess is in no way derived from ethics.17 However, the question of how the goods
take shape in our lives is a question for morality, and it is a question that is answered by way of
practical reasonableness.
Roughly, practical reasonableness is the good we participate in when we reason soundly
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about which course of action to take. It is the same idea as Aristotle’s phronesis. A person with
practical reason (or phronesis or practical wisdom) is one who can reason well about particular
situations and choose a course of action that is the best all things considered. In other words, a
practically wise person—and by ‘practical’ we mean related to human action, that is, those
considerations pertinent to the excellent practice of something—is someone who can decide on the
best course of action because she has considered not only the local contingencies but also how this
one decision will affect the various other goods and commitments she has in her life. Such a person
will not monomaniacally focus on a single good but will instead give each basic value due attention
because she understands that all of the goods are basic. Of course, she need not (and, given human
limitation, should not) try to participate equally in all the goods, but she will respect each good as
equally basic and equally valuable in the abstract.
Because practical reason yields results only in specific situations, laying out the moral
commitments one must have is difficult but not impossible. The problem of general moral
commitments requires general solutions, and that is what natural law can provide. A long tradition
of “philosophical reflection has identified a considerable number of requirements of method in
practical reasoning” that we can provide here (pg. 102, emphasis in original). These requirements
of practical reasonableness are: (i) a coherent (i.e., rational) plan of life, (ii) no arbitrary preference
amongst values, (iii) no arbitrary preference amongst persons, (iv) detachment (from one’s specific
projects),18 (v) commitment (to not lightly abandon one’s projects), (vi) the limited relevance of
consequences, (vii) respect for every basic value in every act (or, no act can directly attack a basic
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value), (viii) promoting the common good, (ix) following one’s conscience.
These requirements of reasonableness help narrow the range of what one ought to do, and,
for us, they are the normative limiting principles of rights. There may seem an initial lack of fit
because practical reasonableness functions on the level of individual actors. In true practically wise
fashion, though, we can reasonably interpret those requirements into a more satisfactory form for
our purposes, especially since these methodological requirements are such that they describe a
principle of reasoning that is not logically limited to individuals. For example, instead of saying
that rights must have a coherent plan of life (a strange claim to be sure), we will simply state that
rights must enable a person to achieve a rational plan of life. And, relatedly, they cannot be of a
form that damages the ability of a person to form such a rational plan. Other requirements seem to
need no interpretation. It seems fairly straightforward to say that rights must show respect for every
basic value, so one would not have a right to directly attack the good of Life. In other words, one
does not have a right to murder.
To go into almost any amount of detail about these requirements would unduly burden our
very limited space here. However, the general statement that rights-as-social-institutions must be
bounded by these requirements yields exceptionally satisfying results. Recall our earlier example
of slavery as a right. Immediately, we can say that a right to own slaves violates the first, third,
fourth, and seventh requirements.19 Slavery certainly destroys the ability of persons to form a
rational plan of life, and it egregiously shows arbitrary preference among persons. These two
violations alone are enough to make the right morally untenable.
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In fact, a more detailed study of the requirements would show that it violates nearly all of them, but these four are
prima facie violated, which is more than enough to rule out slavery as a right.
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A question immediately arises about whether or not a single violation of a requirement is
enough to rule out a right. The answer to this question is, unfortunately, unclear, and the ambiguity
comes from many areas. First, it depends on how one translates the requirements to the language
of rights as to how exactly they will conflict. The requirement that one follows one’s conscience,
for instance, seems to pose a particularly challenging task for the translator. Does it mean that
rights must enable one to follow one’s conscience? If so, does that mean always or in as many
situations as possible? Second, we might question the nature of the task before us. Are we
attempting to look back on past mistakes and decide which rights were morally justified and which
were not? Or are we attempting to make clearer the considerations which factor into public policy
today? The former allows us to speak with a clarity only time provides; the latter is much more
difficult and may prompt one to reach different conclusions.20 The short answer is that we do not
have sufficient space to decide this issue and can only speak in the most general terms. If we can
show why some rights and, a fortiori, why some kinds of rights are morally prohibited (which I
think we have), then our task is accomplished.
We should make one final point in this section. Everything we have put forward so far can
and should be up for debate. We began with a list of basic values; what belongs on that list is
contested. We asserted that things out of our control play a role in determining our concrete
commitments to those values; the extent to which those things should and in fact do make such
determinations is contested. We provided a list of requirements of practical reasonableness; the
content of that list is contested. Finally, we claimed that some translation is required to fit the
requirements to the language of rights; all translations are contested. This debate is part of what
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allows us to reach agreement on these issues. More importantly, it keeps alive the body of
scholarship that is natural law and classical liberalism and allows others to benefit from the work
done by previous generations. (And the classical liberals cheered.)
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CONCLUSION
In the course of this paper, we have attempted to accomplish two main goals. First, we
demonstrated that Hayek’s theory gives insufficient grounding for liberty. The fundamental level
of liberty (and civilization for that matter) is progress, but just what constitutes progress is
something Hayek does not give us. We then showed that a lack of grounding for liberty infects our
account of rights because rights gain their value from liberty. If rights are social institutions, we
need criteria by which to filter the good from the bad. Second, our solution to this problem is to
offer natural law as both a theory of human action that shows why progress and, therefore, liberty
is good and how we can reach conclusions about which rights should and should not exist. The
fundamental level of a natural law theory is the basic values, which allow us to describe human
action and progress in explicit terms. Such a description shows us why we need liberty. Practical
reasonableness provides the method by which we decide how we ought to instantiate the goods in
our lives. This move gives us the moral principles we need to have limiting principles for rights,
which allows us to sort good rights from bad ones. It is no surprise that many natural law theorists
find Hayek (and classical liberalism writ large) an attractive ally in the fight for freedom. Our
contribution has been to show that the two traditions can be more than allies. For as much as Hayek
attempts to avoid moral arguments, he needs them. To the extent that we have demonstrated that,
we have succeeded in our goal.
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